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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 673　21 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0493)　17 August 1950

The dates of the places traveled are not accurate, otherwise the PW seems fairly reliable.

Inducted 9 Mar 50, at NAM SINUIJU and was trained as an infantry soldier until 20 Jun 50.

Following unit was attached direct to 13th Division Hq:

Arty Regt: 45mm AT guns, 76mm & 122 mm guns (number of guns unknown)

Inf Regt’s of 13th Div:

19th Regt (code name unknown)

21st Regt (code name unknown)

23rd Regt (PARK DALNA MU Unit)

Following units attached to Regt:

9 rifle companies (3 Bns) 36 x LMG, rifles, submachine guns

3 HMG companies (1 Bn) 18 x HMG

1 Mortar Plt 6 x 82mm mortars

1 Medic Plt

1 Signal Plt - wireless & field telephone

1 T.C. Unit - 6 x 2½ ton trucks

1 Reconn Plt

13th Division Hq: Unknown

Arty Regiment: Unknown

19th, 21st and 23rd Inf Regiments reported in vicinity of HAJANG DONG, 11 Aug 50.

23rd Regt, 1st Bn C.O. - HONG CHONG WON (홍종원), Capt, age 45. Formerly with the Chinese CCF.

2nd Company C.O. - LEE CHAE GUN (이재근), Lt, age 24. Formerly with the CCF.

4th Platoon leader - CHOE CHAE I (최재이). Jr sgt, age 23. Formerly with the CCF.

13th Division gets it food from occupied areas. The 13th Division’s ammo supply is said to be low (extent unknown). NAKTONG NI is the 13th Division’s central distribution point for ammunition. Ammunition is hand carried to the front lines by division supply troops using trails (avoiding roads). Ammunition supply route north of ANKTONG NI, unknown.

Morale: The morale of the troops is said to be very low. The reason why they can still fight is, because unless they fight, they will be shot by special troops that follow the front line troops.

Replacements: The 13th Division in newly occupied areas were being forced to join the NK Forces. Wounded troops were evacuated to the rear (hand-carried or by stretchers). The slightly wounded troops were ordered to the front without medical treatment. The 13th Division does no have adequate medical supplied or doctors.

A large percentage of the wounded troops died from the lack of medical attention (mortality rate unknown). When troops get lost from parent organization, they have to find their way back because the other units will not accept or feed them. A special unit usually followed the front line troops to prevent the troops from deserting or retreating. This unit is said to shoot troops that fail to keep up with parent organization, and in some cases kill the wounded. PW heard that were killing wounded troops.

Captured equipment: The 13th Division’s captured equipment was not used but was sent to the rear (destination unknown). Captured equipment consisted mostly of carbines and M-1 rifles.

PW heard that the central PW camp for captured American prisoners wast at P’YONGYANG.

PW heard that the central PW camp for captured American prisoners was at P’YONGYANG.

The informant saw North Korean naval troops in INCH’ON on 29 Jun 50 (number unknown).

The people in recently captured areas are against the North Korean Forces and are afraid to vice their feeling because all anti-communists are shot. The informant heard that South Koreans in SEOUL were being forced to join the North Korean Army.

The 13th Division’s plan is to take T’AEGU. An unknown division was on the right flank of the 13th Div. PW was told by his platoon leader that in the event the North Korean Forces are beaten, the Chinese Communist would help them. The troops were ordered not to surrender and in the event of capture to give false information.