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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 612　19 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - FEAF LN TEAM NO. 0110)　2 August 1950

PW entered the army on 7 May 1947, assigned to the 2nd Division. Artillery Regiments, 3rd Battalion, located at KANGDOK, HANGYONG BUKDO. On or about 10 November 1948, he was transferred to 4th Division, Artillery Regiment, Command Company at CHINAMPO. In July 1949, he entered the 2nd Central Political School at PYONGYANG, graduating as a Lt. on 21 May 1950. On 23 May 1950, he was assigned to the Training Company of the Communications Battalion, 4th Division.

Cultural officer.

Japanese.

1 August 1950.

YAMASHITA.

4th Division, Communication Battalion, Training Company.

The battalion was the 451st Communication Battalion, directly attached to the 4th Division. The Battalion received the mail via North Korean Peoples Army, P.O. Box 4446 “NA” (a Korean letter). PW was in charge of Cultural Affairs and Assistant Company Commander.

451st Communications Battalion: LEE CHONG YOON, Lt Col, who received his training in CHINA.

4th Division: LEE KWUN MOO, Major General, who was reported to have received his military training in CHINA.

Training Company: PAK BYUNG KYOO, Lt, who received his training at the PYONGYANG Military Institute.

The 4th Division left CHINNAMPO in the morning of 16 June, reached NAMCHON at night on 16 June, YONCHON 20 June, UIJONGBU, 27 June, SEOUL 28 June, leaving on 1 July, SUWON, PYONGTAEK, CHONAN, KWONGJU, NONSAN, TAEJON, KUNSAN, CHANGGYE-RI, ANUI, KOOHANG, As of 1 Aug 1950 when PW was captured the 18th, 5th, 16th Regiments of the 4th Division were deployed on the hills located about 6 kilometers SW of MYOPCHON. The Regiments in order of proximity to MYOPCHON were as follows: The 18th, 5th, and the 16th in a line running NE/SW, about 500 meters a part.

T/O of the 4th Division called for 3 Infantry Regiments, the 16th, 5th, and 18th, one Artillery Regiment, one Communications Battalion, one Engineers Battalion, one 1200MM Mortar Battalion, one 45MM AT Gun Battalion, one self-propelled Gun Battalion, one Transportation Company, one Reconnaissance Company, one Education Battalion, one Guard Platoon, one Medical Battalion.

T/O of the Communications Battalion called for one Training Company, one Wireless Company, one Telephone Company.

T/O of the Training Company called for one Wireless Platoon, one Telephone Company.

T/O of the Wireless Platoon called for three squads, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. Under the Telephone Platoon, there were four squads, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and the 4th.

T/O of the Artillery Regiment called for 3 Artillery Battalions, 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Under each Battalion, there were 3 companies, the numbers ranging from 1 through 9. Under each company there were 3 Platoons, the first two were Artillery Platoons and the third without a number was the artillery observed divided into two squads.

PW estimated that as of 1 Aug the number in the Communications Battalion was 500, 30 of whom were casualties and later replaced. An estimate of 200 casualties for the entire 4th Division was made. Replacements were soon made.

Nationality of all troops was Korean.

The 4th Division was organized in CHINNAMPO, North KOREA in October 1948. This unit was formed of new recruits and the officers came from other divisions.

PW’s Communication Battalion was trained at CHINNAMPO, North KOREA from October 1948 up to the time of war. Training for the telephone unit consisted of laying telephone wires, mechanics and repairing of telephone. In the wireless unit, the men studied the structure of equipment, its operation, and repairs. PW was not particularly informed on technical communications operations.

PW’s Communications Battalion left CHINNAMPO completely equipped. However, attrition, especially air attacks, depleted their supply, notably, of telephone wire and dry batteries. No replacement was ever brought from the rear. There were two trucks in the Communications Battalion, one for carrying the battery charger and one for carrying food. Gasoline for the trucks was locally procured. Other communications equipment was carried in four horse-drawn wagon. Food was obtained from the local populace, generally without difficulty. The unit had sufficient area and ammunitions.

Mission of the 4th Division was to take TAEJU and PUSAN. Other than that, no immediate mission was known.

1. Rifle: M1891/30 — 250 in the Communications Battalion.

2. Machine gun: PPSH M1941 Tommy gun — 30 in the Bn.

3. Pistols: TT M1933 Tokarev pistols — 20 in the Bn.

F-1 defensive hand grenade and RG-42 offensive hand grenade, 2 por each EM.

In the Artillery Regiment there were the following guns:

122MM M1938 Howitzers: 12 in Regiment.

76MM M1942 gun: 24 in Regiment. (PW knew about artillery as he was an artillery man for about nine months.)

In the mortar Battalion attached to the 4th Division were twenty 120MM M1938 mortars. In the 45MM AT Gun Battalion attached to the 4th Division there were twelve of the 45MM AT guns.

In the “self-propelled gun” battalion in the 4th Division, there were 14 SU-76 vehicles. There was no other armor in the Division. PW never observed the SU-76 in action; hence tactics and maneuverability unknown.

When the 4th Division was advancing, the self-propelled guns Battalion advanced between infantry regiments. Gun vehicles kept about 20 meters apart and proceeded forward in single file.

None in the Communications Battalion, there were five horses for wagons.

The entire personnel of the 18th Regiment (all Koreans) came from CHINA. Two Soviet advisors were observed at CHINNAMPO 2 or 3 times in June 1950.

In the 451st Communication Battalion, there were five tank and self-propelled gun radio units, 25 field telephones TAN #43, switchboards, type unknown. There was no other communications equipment in the battalion.

PW’s unit underwent air attacks at PYONGTAEK around the middle of July. Until that date the 4th Division had been advancing during the day: however, from mid-July, only night marches were undertaken. Speaking of the Communications Battalion, PW stated that two wagons loaded with rails of telephone wires were destroyed, but no other equipment. No personnel casualties resulted. PW heard that “Considerable” leases occurred in other infantry Regiments, the Artillery Regiments, and the self-propelled gun unit, but no estimate could be given.

As to the effectiveness of air attacks, PW did not know the exact conditions behind the lines; however, he did hear that supply lines were out by the air raids.

PW attended the Second Central Political School at PYONGYANG, North KOREA from July 1949 to 21 May 1950 and graduated as a Cultural Officer. The school war located in a village named MANGYANG DAE, approximately 4 miles SW of PYONGYANG RR Station. The building itself was a 3 story brick structure, 100 m x 10 m x 20 m, surfaced with concrete. This school was the largest building in the village and lay in the eastern outskirts near this school was a smaller two-story brick hospital, 100 m x 8 m x 15 m.

The student body numbered 1,200. Students selected for this school were from among the soldiers of the North Korean Peoples Army.

Qualifications: No age limit, elementary school education; most of the students were nonsense. Certain soldiers were recommended by their commanding officer, to attend the school. Those recommended took a physical and underwent an oral examination at division headquarters. The main qualification was devotion to the Communist course. If successful, the candidate took another oral test given at the school from the instructor. Topics: international situation, domestic affairs and knowledge of Communist ideals. If the soldier passed, then he was admitted to the school.

The school was first established in 1946 in CHINNAMPO and transferred to PYONGCHON-NI, PYONGYANG City in 1948. It was again transferred to MANGYOUNG DAE in July 1949. PW entered the 5th Class of the Second Central political School. Hours of instruction were from 0800 to 1800, including one hour for lunch and one hour of rest. The course of instruction lasted 9 months, in three months terms. Subject taught included World Economies, World Politics, World Geography, Cultural operations in the Army, study of North Korean Government, History of KOREA, History of Russian Communist Party, mathematics, Manual of arms, combat tactics, discipline.

Students graduated were commissioned as lieutenants. There were three groups of students in the student body of 1,200. The largest group was 800.

After graduation, the men either became culture officers and assistant commanding officers or political officers in the Political Security Bureau.

In addition to the above 800, there were 200 who were assigned to a special training course lasting only 3 months. Courses were selected from among the subjects above.

The remaining 200 of the 1,200 students received a 2-year course in the Russian language, becoming language officers upon graduation.

The president of the school was KIM CHONG HAK (金種學), 42, a Major General. Political assistant to the president was LEE CHOON PAEK (李春白), 35, Colonel; the military assistant was LYOO KA E (柳아아), 45, Sr Col. The Head instructor who undertook supervisory and administrative details, was KIM TONG SOO, 32, Colonel. The political assistant was in charge of approximately eighty instructors, (ten instructors per academic non-military subjects). Under the military assistant were ten instructors for each for the two military subjects.

The student body of 1,200 was divided into seven companies, including two special companies, the 6th and the 7th. The 6th was composed of men studying to become language officers, while the 7th was reserved for the special 3-months course. Every three months a new group of students entered the 7th company. Each company was composed of four platoons, except the 1st which had five. Each platoon was divided into three squads. The company commander was generally a captain, who was not a student. PW only knew the name of the 1st Company commander, LO CHIN KUN.

Throughout North KOREA, electricity was supplied only between the hours of 1900 to 0600. Only certain factories were supplied power before 1900. This electrical power blackout was in effect in 1945 to 1946.

There was no conscription in North KOREA until 1 July 1950, when a general Mobilization Law drafted men between the ages of 18 to 36. Until 1 July, the army ranks were filled by volunteers. In occupied areas the local people also come under the Mobilization Law. Public reaction was not openly expressed. Young peoples groups and students ostensibly approved the Mobilization Law. PW felt that there was considerable antipathy toward the law, but it did not appear on the surface. Troops accepted the mobilization as a matter of fact.

Police measures were said to be severe in general, but he 3rd degree measures were over used. PW claims that no political prisoners were taken. Public reaction is good in that the people fear the police less than under Japanese rule; they look upon the police as the guardians of peace.

1. Only sign seen by PW was verbal complaints by farmers on the high “spot taxes” (taxes on farm products levied on the spot during the harvesting season). No organized opposition movement was noted.

2. As to public reaction in bombed areas, PW only heard that in PYONGYANG, the peoples were frightened, but few went to the country to escape air raids.

3. Only area of guerrilla concentration in South KOREA known to PW was that in the CHIRI-SAN mountains about twenty miles NW of CHINJU. In these mountains were estimated to be about 2,500 Communist guerrillas who had begun a revolution in South KOREA in June 1949, beginning at the cities of YOSU and SUNCHON. The degree of cooperation affected between the guerrillas in the CHIRI-SAN mountains and the North Korean Army unknown.

4. As to North Korean war preparations, PW would only give general information, such as that the Russian began building up the war strength of North KOREA IN 1946. As the member of divisions grew, more equipment would be brought in.

5. Effectiveness of radio broadcasts:

North Koreans were strictly prohibited from listening to South Korean broadcasts. If a person were caught listening the entire family would be closely investigated and surveillance maintained. Then the head of the household would be put in prison for 3 days. If the crime was repeated, the head of the household would be tried by a Peoples Court.

6. North Korean Army did not utilize leaflets. PW himself never saw any South Korean leaflets so he could not say what the circulation was, or the influence of leaflets.

A Subject of study was determined for one week at a time. These subjects were the propaganda lines spread by the North Koreans. The subject for study was selected by GHQ. The schedule of the indoctrination was a follows:

Monday: 2 hours of lecture by the Cultural Officer to the NGO’s; by the Platoon commander to his men.

Wednesday: 2 hours of review of the lecture given on Monday.

Friday: 2 hours of discussion. In addition to the above political indoctrination the Cultural assistant handled recreation and physical education in the Company. When the unit was on the move southward, the Cultural Officer had no responsibilities as there was no time for cultural and political activities.

At the top, is the Division Commander for Cultural Affairs, a Sr Col. Below him is the Cultural Affairs Commander, a Colonel. The Cultural Affairs Department is divided into three groups at the division level, the Minsei (Youth Alliance for Democracy) Guidance Section, the Propaganda Section, and the Statistics Section. The Minsei Guidance Section, supervises and has direct control over members of the Minsei, which is the pre-army military and political training group. The Propaganda Section takes charge of propaganda activities for the troops, while the Statistics Section is in charge of statistics of political and recreational activities of the Cultural Affairs Department of the division.

At the Regimental level, there is the Regimental Commander of Cultural Affairs, a Lt Col. Below him are the Minsei advisor, a captain, and a Propaganda Section Chief, a Major. At the Battalion level, there is the Battalion Commander of Cultural Affairs, a Captain, below whom are the Minsei Advisor, a 1st Lt and the Propaganda Section Chief, a Captain. At the lowest echelon is the Company Commander of Cultural Affairs, who is at the same time the assistant Company Commander.

PW did not possess much information regarding the Political Security Bureau. The headquarters of the Political Security Bureau is said to be located in the GHQ of the North Korean Peoples Army and Political Security Bureaus are found at division, regimental and battalion levels.

Political officers take the same courses as the Cultural officers at the Central Political School and the requirements are the same.

Political officers are primarily concerned with prevention of revolt withing the Army and subversive activities against the government. Deserters from the Army are also taken care of by the Political Security Bureau.

In an evaluation of this report, it must be remembered that the source of Information was first of all an officer and secondly a Cultural officer. These feature may be the reason for generalities given in certain portions of this report, also for the lack of technical details in other sections. Being an officer and at the same time a Cultural-Political leader of troops, it is assumed that source would naturally only speak well of North Korean conditions and army activities. Any evils of the system in North KOREA, it must be presumed, would remain undisclosed.